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Nomenclature 
 
ALSA = Astronaut Life Support Assembly 
AMU = Astronaut Maneuvering Unit 
CIL = Critical Items List 
CKO = chief knowledge officer 
CM = command module 
CTSD = Crew and Thermal Systems Division 
DCC = David Clark, Company 
DCS = decompression sickness 
EMU = Extravehicular Mobility Unit 
EVA = extravehicular activity 
FMEA = Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
FRR = flight readiness review 
HQ = Headquarters 
HSD = Hamilton Standard Division 
HUT = hard upper torso 
ILC = International Latex Corporation 
ISS = International Space Station  
JSC = Johnson Space Center 
KC = knowledge capture 
KSC = Kennedy Space Center 
LEO = low-Earth orbit 
LM = lunar module 
LSU = life support umbilical  
NASM = National Air and Space Museum  
NTRS = NASA Technical Reports Server  
OPS = Oxygen Purge System 
OWS = Orbital Workshop 
PCU = Pressure Control Unit 
PECS = Portable Environmental Control System 
PLSS = Primary Life Support System 
psi = pounds per square inch  
psid = pounds per square inch differential 
PTFE = Polytetrafluoroethylene 
RCU = Remote Control Unit 
SOMA = Skylab Oxygen Mask Assembly 
SOP = secondary oxygen package 
SR&QA = Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance 
SSA = Spacesuit Assembly 
SSF = Space Station Freedom 
STI = Scientific and Technical Information 
TMS = The Museum System by Gallery Systems, Inc. 
UV = ultraviolet 
 
I. Introduction 
HE U.S. spacesuit is a critical piece of NASA’s history and legacy. The heritage is rich and grounded with 
magnificent accomplishments. As use of the current Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) ends and as a new 
spacesuit is developed, a critical juncture exists to preserve U.S. spacesuit heritage. The U.S. spacesuits and their 
legacy is one of America’s most precious possessions. If this spacesuit knowledge were lost, it would be 
catastrophic to future scientific achievements.  
The U.S. Spacesuit Knowledge Capture (KC) program is capturing and storing valuable stories, lessons learned, 
and knowledge about legacy spacesuits. In addition, it is of utmost importance to preserve the historical physical 
elements of the spacesuits to adequately design future spacesuits. The most significant physical elements include the 
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“hard” documentation and the spacesuit hardware. These physical elements exist in many venues and must be 
preserved and made easily accessible to educate those who are eager to learn and to allow engineers to develop 
future spacesuits. These repositories of knowledge become paramount in preserving spacesuit legacy. 
Along with the “hard” documentation and spacesuit hardware, it is important to consider some of the most 
valuable lessons from NASA’s spacesuit history to know how to use them. This paper presents the spacesuit legacy 
programs that encompass manned spaceflight and the paramount lessons that are some of the most valuable that 
influence spacesuit legacy from a different perspective. Hardware and documents can illustrate a historical story that 
reflects a spacesuit design. However, there are sometimes other aspects that help achieve the final destination or 
design. These factors influenced past manned spaceflight programs and impacted the resultant hardware unlike those 
of the technological advancements. To be able to chart a reasonably planned program for future spacesuit systems, it 
is vital to understand how these factors interacted during past programs, and to gain insight into how to improve 
future hardware and the facilitating of the management and participating organizations. To do this, this paper shares 
lessons learned from the former programs of Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, shuttle and, the International Space 
Station (ISS). 
II. State of Knowledge Capture Strategy 
NASA must preserve the rich history of its spacesuit program for the trove of design information, procedural 
knowledge, and lessons learned to inform future spaceflight engineers and historians. NASA is implementing new 
programs and strategies to help facilitate this endeavor and has named Dr. Edward J. Hoffman as the agency’s new 
KC officer, and individual NASA centers have created knowledge officer positions to archive information in 
multiple repositories. Additionally, grass-roots efforts to document knowledge of specific disciplines have arisen 
throughout the agency. The U.S. Spacesuit KC program is an example of these efforts. Likewise, other programs, 
such as the Johnson Space Center (JSC) Oral History Project, have added to the robustness of manned spaceflight 
efforts. All these archiving opportunities help facilitate the preservation of spacesuit knowledge as well.  
Hoffman realizes that the challenge of sharing knowledge effectively impacts all of NASA: “Developing more 
consistent knowledge capability across the agency was part of what motivated the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 
(ASAP), an advisory group established by Congress, to recommend that NASA ‘establish a single focal point (a 
Chief Knowledge Officer [CKO]) within the agency to develop the policy and requirements necessary to integrate 
knowledge capture across programs, projects, and centers.’ ASAP acknowledged good work in this area at Johnson 
Space Center and Goddard Space Flight Center, and also recommended that all centers and mission directorates 
consider establishing CKOs to ‘ensure standardization.’ ”1 
In February 2012, Hoffman met with the agency’s knowledge community and took inventory of knowledge 
services and activities at different centers and mission directorates. The knowledge community, which includes 
center chief knowledge officers and practitioners from each center and certain NASA entities meet approximately 
once a month to collaborate and understand how to share information across the agency.
1
 
Hoffman is forming an agency knowledge strategy by working with CKOs and knowledge leads at the centers 
and mission directorates. Hoffman described what NASA will provide for KC: “While the details of the strategy are 
still being developed, some of its core principles are already clear. It will integrate knowledge policy and 
requirements with those for program/project management; knowledge is inseparable from project success and should 
not be treated as a stand-alone discipline. It will focus on establishing both systems that make knowledge accessible 
and a culture that values learning and knowledge. Finally, it will respect existing knowledge practices and local 
customs while setting agency-wide norms for knowledge identification, capture, and dissemination.”2 
Currently, NASA centers and entities have their own individual implementation for knowledge capture (e.g., lessons 
learned, best practices, case studies, etc.). Knowledge capture activities include documenting and storing lectures 
from subject matter experts and search and tagging tools such as taxonomy, ontology, and meta-tagging. These tools 
add relationships between categories to enhance search capability. A knowledge map to chart agency activities was 
released in May 2013:  http://km.nasa.gov/knowledge-map/.
3 
For information about NASA knowledge mapping: 
http://www.nasa.gov/offices/oce/appel/ask/issues/46/46d_director.html.
4
 
Jean E. Engle is JSC’s CKO who manages JSC Knowledge Online, which is a resource center for knowledge 
sharing at JSC. JSC Knowledge Online collects and stores story telling events, case studies, historical records, and 
other forms of useful space-related knowledge and makes this information accessible to authorized agency users.
5
 
Scientific and Technical Information (STI) is NASA’s central repository for technical and scientific information. 
The NASA Aeronautics and Space Database (NASD) is a database that NASA users and the public can access. 
A new knowledge-capture program was initiated in NASA’s Space Suit and Crew Survival Systems Branch in 
2007. A paper entitled “U.S. Spacesuit Knowledge Capture (KC) Status and Initiatives,” presented at the 
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International Conference on Environmental Systems in 2012, sponsored by the AIAA, provides a detailed 
description about the program over the first five years of its existence. U.S. Spacesuit KC manager Cinda Chullen 
started and leads this program. The program’s main objective is to capture the lessons learned from spacesuit subject 
matter experts. Avenues to capture the information include lectures, lunch-and-learn sessions, interviews, and 
courses. Each event is digitally recorded and archived and made available to engineers designing a new spacesuit. 
After events are deemed public releasable, they are archived through the NASA Scientific and Technical 
Information (STI) Center.
6
  
Other programs, such as the Johnson Space Center (JSC) Oral History Project, have added to the robustness of 
manned spaceflight knowledge capture preservation. Through the JSC Oral History Project, the History Office 
collects first-hand experiences, eliciting details of procedures, processes, methodologies, rationale, and background 
of operations, design, and development.  Individuals participating in the JSC Oral History Project have made key 
contributions to the Center’s history and achievement of goals.  Prior to the interview, extensive research about the 
person and the projects, programs, and areas where the person worked is gathered to form questions specifically to 
extract details.  Interviews feature open-ended inquiries to prevent biased answers or skewed responses.  The JSC 
Oral History team has gathered knowledge for this ongoing project since 1996 and consists of four members 
including the JSC Historian, (Dr. Jennifer Ross-Nazzal) who is a proven space history scholar, receiving awards for 
her work and being published in numerous journals and publications.  The team also has facilitated a number of 
other oral history projects for the Center and for the NASA Headquarters History Office, such as Columbia 
Recovery, Space Shuttle Program Tacit Knowledge Capture, Earth System Science, Shuttle-Mir, and gathered data 
from former NASA administrators and officials.  More than 1000 people have been interviewed and transcripts are 
accessible to all via online at the JSC History Portal, (www.jsc.nasa.gov/history), a single source for all online JSC 
history resources that receives an average of one-half million hits per month. 
The history team has worked with the JSC Space Suit & Crew Survival Systems Branch to support its 
knowledge capture effort in numerous ways that include conducting interviews with subject matter experts, 
providing these experts research support, and offering methodology techniques for gathering and sharing 
information.  
Another critical repository is the Smithsonian. 
III. The Importance of Spacesuit “Hardware” Preservation 
The National Air and Space Museum (NASM) has accumulated a valuable repository of spacesuit system 
artifacts. The collection spans the timeframe of the earliest suits used by Wiley Post, through the early Air Force 
programs focusing on supersonic flight, on through the Mercury, Gemini, Air Force Manned Orbiting Laboratory, 
Apollo, Skylab, and Apollo-Soyuz Test Project programs, and includes artifacts from the shuttle and ISS programs. 
NASM archives contain over 1200 spacesuits and related items that are preserved for present and future 
generations. After nearly 12 years of planning, on November 2011, the Smithsonian Institution’s NASM began 
moving its spacesuit collection from its storage facility at the Paul E. Garber Facility in Suitland, Maryland to its 
new, state-of-the-art facility at the Stephen F. Udvar-Hazy Center in Chantilly, Virginia near Dulles Airport (Fig.1). 
The new facility has the suit collection sorted according to program, ranging in size from the hard suits from Litton, 
AirResearch, Ames, and JSC, through the flown, training developmental and contract suits from the Apollo 
program, Manned Orbiting Laboratory suit, followed by the Gemini, Mercury, and aviation flight suits. 
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Now that the spacesuits are in their new permanent home, planning has turned to documenting the collection. 
During her years as curator of the spacesuit collection, Amanda Young collected many linear feet of hardcopy 
documentation on the development and documentation of spacesuits.
7
 None of these resources has been digitized. 
NASA has posted several hundred articles concerning the spacesuits in its NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS). 
The next step in preserving and documenting the collection is to digitize, index, and catalogue these resources. The 
Air and Space Museum’s cataloguing system, The Museum System by Gallery Systems, Inc., (TMS) is housed on a 
secure server and only very limited information is synced to the Smithsonian’s public web pages. For those reasons, 
the museum catalogue is not an appropriate forum for interactive and trans-institutional collaborative discussion and 
assessment. 
During 2011, Air and Space Museum curator, Dr. Cathleen Lewis has explored some possibilities for an 
appropriate forum for interactive collaboration. Culling from NTRS and other academic online catalogues to collect 
citations and articles that provide insight on the development of the spacesuit, she has assembled almost 800 
citations to date. This total excludes the user manuals and technical reports that Young had collected, but which 
have not yet been digitized and released through NTRS. Most of the available databases include export features to 
standard academic bibliographic databases. In 2011, it seemed that the best opportunities for collaborating in this 
literature search would be through the on-line versions of bibliographic databases. Unfortunately, the membership 
and access limitations to these on-line bibliographies do not meet the current needs for the U.S. Spacesuit KC 
program. The goal is to find a suitable way to share and collaborate on the collection and collaboration of these 
resources among the greater spacesuit community and to post questions and answers of interest. The U.S. Spacesuit 
KC program is considering solutions that would allow external collaboration.  
IV. The Importance of “Hard” Documentation Preservation 
The importance of “hard” documentation in the schema of KC cannot be overestimated. Although memories and 
recollections are valuable and instructive, the fine details are best captured in physically retrievable records. This 
documentation can be in the form of reports, video, audio, personnel records, post-flight debriefs, interviews, and 
lessons learned. It can then be made available to the engineers, technicians, and managers. In addition, the 
documentation can be archived with the knowledge-based programs and made available to educate the engineers and 
managers thereafter. Records dealing with all phases of project design, development, certification, failure reporting 
and resolution, in-flight use, and program closeout can be invaluable to designers and managers involved with the 
future spacesuit systems. It is a challenge to collect, organize, and disseminate documentation, but these functions 
are key to an effective KC. 
 
Figure 1. The Stephen F. Udvar-Hazy Center 
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The Astronaut Life Support Assembly/Skylab 
Oxygen Mask Assembly (ALSA/SOMA) Program Final 
Report, shown in Fig. 2, offers an example of valuable 
historical information.
8
 This final report might be used 
to illustrate the scope of program material that was 
gathered and organized to preserve experience gained. 
The ALSA consisted of a front-mounted package called 
the Pressure Control Unit, or PCU, containing pressure-
regulation equipment, controls and displays; a 60-foot 
life support umbilical (LSU), which provided supply 
and return coolant lines, an oxygen line, electrical 
cabling, and a load-bearing tether; and a leg-mounted 
secondary oxygen package, or SOP, which provided 30 
minutes of purge flow during loss of oxygen supply 
from the spacecraft. The SOMA was to be used during a 
contaminated atmosphere inside the Orbital Workshop 
(OWS). It consisted of a full-face mask outfitted with a 
demand regulator and hose, and could supply oxygen to 
a crewmember through the spacecraft oxygen supply or 
from the SOP. 
Because of the May 1973 near-catastrophic loss of a 
solar array and critical insulation for the OWS 
experienced during the Skylab I launch, extravehicular 
activity (EVA) played a crucial role in successfully 
releasing the one remaining jammed solar array. 
Without this source of power, the remaining missions 
would have been impossible. Also, without EVA, the 
replacement of the sunshade parasol with the final long-duration shade assembly would have been impossible. 
The ALSA final report covers the period from January 1970 through March 1974. The report is presented in two 
volumes, with the first focusing on the period from January 1970 through June 1973. The design, development, 
testing, change history, certification testing, failure summary, and hardware item descriptions are contained in 
Volume I. In addition, the contractor’s program structure is discussed, along with significant milestones, changes, 
and redirection. Volume II focuses more on flight use of the hardware, with detailed descriptions of EVA missions 
and their outcomes regarding the ALSA. Volume II also describes the contractor’s field support effort at JSC and 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC), along with the in-plant effort supporting the flight hardware and field. Final 
disposition of flight articles is also presented. 
Through a presentation of program change orders, the report gives a detailed illustration of how requirements 
changed through both evolution and “step” changes. Timelines showing major program events, planned and 
unplanned, add to the depth of understanding of how an ongoing, dynamic program evolves. 
Not all programs provide such a wealth of specific information–because of their very size and duration, some 
make the task daunting. This makes the study of the available information all that much more valuable. People need 
information of past mistakes and successes to learn from them. Memory is a wonderful tool, but it can be selective, 
and can impart a romantic patina that objective documentation will not. It is important to gain a fuller insight into 
the past as a guide to the future. 
V. Progression of Spacesuit Legacy 
The history of U.S. spaceflight encompasses manned and unmanned programs–each with its own rich heritage of 
accomplishments and failures and the resultant experience gained, to be embraced or ignored by succeeding 
programs. Manned spaceflight carries with it the inherent need to provide humans with the ability to perform safely 
and reliably in a hostile environment, and it was this need that created the spacesuit systems of Mercury, Gemini, 
Apollo, Skylab, shuttle and, ISS. 
Since radical leaps in technology were sometimes required to meet the objectives of these programs, it is 
tempting to suppose that the designs of these spacesuit systems were a straightforward result of specific technical 
requirements, generated by the application of the laws of physics, molded to fit time and budgetary constraints, and 
 
Figure 2. ALSA/SOMA Program Final Report 
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executed during flight with computer-like precision. However, people must beware of oversimplifying the past. 
Technology was only one of many factors that affected the outcomes of spacesuit programs of the past. 
During the U.S. manned space programs, the spacesuit systems used were a product of many–sometimes 
conflicting–factors. Technical requirements were a necessary part of the equation, but changing political 
environments, funding constraints, unforeseen events, and–perhaps most influential of all–the distinct personalities 
of the participating organizations and the individuals who carried out the day-to-day engineering and management 
tasks had as much or more of an influence on the resultant hardware that was used in manned spaceflight programs. 
The laws of physics involved in these programs were the same for Wiley Post, when he flew the B. F. Goodrich 
suit in 1934, and they will remain the same in the future. Although the laws are well understood and documented, 
exactly how they apply in a given situation is often problematic. The engineers and managers of past spacesuit 
programs were dedicated, capable, and innovative, but chance and human error sometimes frustrated their best 
efforts.    
The following subsections examine and analyze the program objectives, technical requirements, and other 
influencing factors as they occurred during past U.S. manned-spaceflight programs, with specific reference to the 
spacesuit systems involved.  
A. Program Objectives– Pre-Mercury, Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, Shuttle, ISS 
Basic programmatic elements (i.e., objectives, goals, and requirements) are the primary foundation for what is 
perceived to be the U.S. space industry’s grounds for establishing a “spacesuit legacy history.” These basic elements 
help people understand how similar influencing factors will drive and determine future spacesuit system 
architectures. The space industry should know, however, that there are also many other underlying factors involved 
that tend to shape the outcome of various space programs, and correspondingly, affect the subsequent development 
of spacesuit hardware systems that are associated with those particular programs. The following overview in the 
subsections below gives some historical insight and perspective to a few of the driving factors. Insight into these 
factors and how they influenced the progress of spacesuit programs are illustrated by examples drawn from the 
history of the pre-Mercury period, Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Skylab, shuttle, and ISS programs. A pictorial of the 
spacesuit legacy’s progression is provided in Fig. 3. 
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Figure 3. Progression of the spacesuit legacy. 
1. Pre-Mercury 
The origins of the spacesuit lie in aviation and man’s quest for higher altitudes and speeds. At the beginning of 
the 1930s, these two human desires drove the development of high-altitude pressure suits. The quest for achieving 
altitude records used balloons. The pursuit of higher and higher speeds also involved reaching high altitudes to use 
the east-to-west wind regime, now called the jet stream, could increase the travel speed of the fastest of airplanes by 
an additional 50%.   
The pressurized cabins required by aircraft to maintain a viable atmosphere at these high altitudes added weight, 
which limited speed, and added great expense. To overcome these factors, the pioneer aviator Wiley Post concepted 
the first high-altitude pressure-suit system to reach operational use for a coast-to-coast air-speed record attempt. Post 
hired B. F. Goodrich to design and manufacture the pressure garment. Russell Colley was the Goodrich project 
engineer. As a result, Colley oversaw the development of U.S. industry leading high-altitude pressure suits during 
the cold war competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.   
 
a. Results 
It was fitting that the Goodrich Mark IV military suit was selected as the basis for the Mercury Program, the first 
U.S. venture into space. The first pressure suit used in the United States was a Goodrich suit worn by early aviator 
Post in his record-setting high-altitude flights.  
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2. Mercury 
Project Mercury was the nation’s first venture into manned space flight. The Mercury program was initiated in 
October 1958 after the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (predecessor to NASA), the military, industry, 
and other government agencies had conducted approximately a year of combined research and studies. NASA was 
created by the Space Act that President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed into law on July 29, 1958.
9
 The Mercury 
program established a broad set of objectives since humans had never flown in space before. 
For the Mercury program, NASA established the following set of specific program guidelines: existing 
technology and off-the-shelf equipment should be used wherever practical, the simplest and most reliable approach 
to system design would be followed, an existing launch vehicle would be employed to place the spacecraft into 
orbit, and a stepwise  program consisting of unmanned flights, flights with primates, sub-orbital manned flights, and, 
ultimately, multi-orbit manned missions would be used. 
Since a new area of flight was being investigated, the United States planned to use a buildup-type of flight-test 
program, in which each component or system would be flown to successively more severe and rigorous conditions 
to first prove the concept, then to qualify the design, and finally to prove, through some repeated use, the reliability 
of the system. One of the basic problems that demanded a solution for the successful accomplishment of the 
Mercury program was providing for the physiological well-being of the capsule-confined pilot-astronaut in space 
during both sub-orbital and orbital mission operations.
10, 11
 
The major spacecraft system that was essential for sustaining the astronaut in flight was the environmental 
control system, with the pressure suit being an important element of the system. However, since the pressure suit 
was provided primarily as a backup during the loss of cabin pressure, the suit architecture was based on the 1961 
state-of-the-art operational Navy Mark IV high-altitude pressure suit to serve this role. Also, since the pressure suit 
was to be primarily worn unpressurized, no significant suit mobility development activities were conducted to 
directly support the Mercury program. 
 
a. Results 
One of the primary lessons learned from the Mercury program during its 55-month history was that humans were 
still needed to work in conjunction with machines. As flight director Christopher C. Kraft expressed it, “Man is the 
deciding element. As long as man is able to alter the decision of the machine, we will have a spacecraft that can 
perform under any known conditions, and that can probe into the unknown for new knowledge.”12 This statement 
was a profound indicator of the critical role of humans, especially humans operating in the space environment, 
which was to be exemplified in future programs. 
 
3. Gemini 
Project Gemini was one of the United States’ early pioneering efforts that advanced the development of space 
operations capabilities. This program’s initiation was timed to profit from the knowledge gained and lessons learned 
in the U.S. space program’s first series of Project Mercury manned sub-orbital and orbital spaceflights. 
The Gemini program’s objectives, goals, and requirements included the investigations of the operations and 
performance capabilities of  astronauts outside the confines of the spacecraft (i.e., extravehicular operations, known 
as “EVA”) while protected from the hard vacuum and hazards of space by a pressurized spacesuit.13 The full-
opening door gave ready access to space and the Apollo program eagerly awaited the EVA experience to be gained. 
Although the Gemini spacesuit was initially based on a conventional high-altitude U.S. Air Force pressure suit 
configuration, the necessary modifications required for EVA and the operational knowledge gained and lessons 
learned during the Gemini program were vital to the ensuing development of the Apollo and later spacesuit systems.   
The two life-support systems used during Gemini were umbilical-based approaches. The first system was a small 
chestpack used by Ed White in June 1965 for a 36-minute EVA. Oxygen flowed at 100 psi through the umbilical 
and was throttled into the suit at the chestpack. Suit pressure was controlled by a relief valve on the outlet of the suit, 
that vented the effluent oxygen to space. The ventilating oxygen carried off perspired and respired moisture, along 
with expired carbon dioxide. The chestpack carried a manually-activated 5-minute emergency oxygen bottle. 
The other system was a somewhat larger chestpack used for Gemini IX-A through Gemini XII. It recirculated 
part of the flow, and although carbon dioxide and moisture were vented overboard through a pressure relief valve, 
additional cooling was provided by evaporating stored water in a heat exchanger. A 30-minute, automatically 
activated emergency oxygen system was provided. 
 
a. Results 
There were numerous specific findings that were critical to the spacesuit system’s continuing development, as 
well as the performance of an EVA itself. Two spacesuit system findings were significant: 
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1) The mobility limitations imposed by the spacesuit-affected-mission results, causing high workloads. Hand 
fatigue experienced on the 2-hour EVAs was particularly noticeable. This finding emphasized the need for 
low-effort joints and improvement in glove mobility. 
2) The selection of crewmember cooling using chilled ventilating gas flow relied on perspiration to remove the 
heat generated by the crewman’s workload. The inadequacy of this approach was dramatically demonstrated 
on two missions where the EVA crewmember experienced excessive sweating. The corrective action taken 
was to carefully monitor and control the workload. This finding underscored the need for a radical change in 
the cooling approach. As a result, Apollo and subsequent programs firmly implemented cooling using chilled 
water flowing through tubes woven into a close-fitting garment.
14
 
 
4. Apollo 
Regarding the future Apollo program, President Kennedy was eager for the United States to lead in the Space 
Race for strategy and prestige. He first announced the goal of landing a man on the Moon in the speech to a Joint 
Session of Congress on May 25, 1961: 
 "First, I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on 
the Moon and returning him safely to the Earth. No single space project in this period will be more impressive to 
mankind, or more important for the long-range exploration of space; and none will be so difficult or expensive to 
accomplish." 
 Kennedy also made a speech at Rice University on September 12, 1962:   
 “We choose to go to the moon. We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are 
easy, but because they are hard, because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, 
because that challenge is one that we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one which we intend to 
win, and the others, too.”  
With these words spoken at Rice University, President Kennedy formally ushered in the Apollo program. There 
were five major Apollo program objectives:
15, 16, 17
 
i.To demonstrate endurance of humans and equipment to spaceflight for at least eight days required for a Moon 
landing, to a maximum of two weeks 
ii.To affect rendezvous and docking with another vehicle, and to maneuver the combined spacecraft using the 
propulsion system of the target vehicle 
iii.To demonstrate EVAs, or space-walks outside the protection of the spacecraft, and to evaluate the astronauts' 
ability to perform tasks there 
iv.To perfect techniques of atmospheric reentry and landing at a pre-selected location 
v.To provide the astronauts with zero-gravity, rendezvous, and docking experience required for Apollo 
The third objective as stated above, was the primary driving force for initiating the design and development of 
portable life-support system and spacesuit mobility joint technologies that would enable humans, for the first time, 
to explore and conduct operations on the surface of another planet. 
The Apollo EMU consisted of a spacesuit and a totally self-contained, closed-loop life-support system, thus 
freeing the crewmember of umbilicals. 
The life-support system, in its ultimate form, was designed for up to 6 hours on the lunar surface. The emergency 
oxygen system was manually actuated, and was designed for 30 minutes.  
Cremember cooling was achieved by pumping chilled water from the backpack through a close-fitting garment 
into which small tubes had been woven. This proved to be an effective way to avoid the overheating caused by the 
inadequate ventilation-type cooling used during Gemini. 
 
a. Results 
The success of the Apollo program during six lunar landing missions contributed much to the spacesuit legacy.  
Some of the lessons learned are listed below: 
1) Spacesuit joints, though much more mobile than their Gemini predecessors, still imposed a significant effort 
to bend and hold a position;  the amount of work required would probably have been unacceptable for 
extensive lunar exploration.   
2) Food and water provisioning to the suited crewmember was imperfect. The helmet pass-through port 
represented a significant failure point. Water bottles frequently leaked. On at least two occasions, orange juice 
that had leaked out of its container resulted in skin irritation. 
3) The restraint cables used on the arms and legs of the spacesuit were single-failure points which, though never 
failing in flight, experienced several failures during manned ground testing on treadmills.   
4) The need to customize suits to fit specific astronauts was the principal driver in determining suit quantities.18 
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5. Skylab 
Following Apollo, the Skylab program was America’s first experimental space station. It was designed to 
conduct long-duration missions in low-Earth orbit (LEO). The Skylab objectives were twofold.
19
 
i. To prove humans could live and work in space for extended periods  
ii. To expand the U.S. space industry’s knowledge of solar astronomy well beyond Earth-based 
observations  
To minimize cost of this short-lived program, most, if not all of the program hardware was based on Apollo-era 
technology and hardware, including the modified A7L-B spacesuits worn by the Skylab astronauts. 
While the selection of the spacesuit for Skylab was relatively straightforward, the choice of an associated life-
support system was complicated.   
The requirements of the Skylab life-support system were varied. First and foremost, it had to accommodate 
multiple EVAs to service the instruments mounted on the Apollo Telescope Mount, a large structure that extended 
some distance from the Skylab Cluster. There was also a series of EVA simulations to be performed in the 
voluminous interior of the OWS. Several types of maneuvering units were to be evaluated, and this would involve 
providing cooling, power, communications, oxygen, pressurization, thermal control, and carbon dioxide control to a 
suited cremember. 
Potential candidates included the Apollo Primary Life Support System/Oxygen Purge System/Remote Control 
Unit (PLSS/OPS/RCU) combination, the Gemini life-support system, or a new system. 
As the technical specialists, Crew and Thermal Systems Division (CTSD) had been investigating an advanced 
life-support system called the Portable Environmental Control System (PECS). This system was a 4-hour, closed-
loop system with the additional feature of being able to operate from an umbilical. For an oxygen supply, it used 
sodium chlorate “candles,” which, when ignited, emitted oxygen, and left sodium chloride as the residue. At one 
time, NASA planned to use the PECS on the latter Gemini flights, but it was ruled out because of the cost and the 
problems faced by the Gemini EVA program. NASA thought of using the PECS on latter Apollo missions, but the 
termination of the program after Apollo 17 scuttled those plans. Now, it seemed, there was an opportunity in Skylab 
for the PECS. 
CTSC dutifully performed tradeoffs considering all the candidates that had been identified. The Skylab Program 
Office, however, was not interested in a system with more capability than they needed. Also, the Skylab vehicle had 
plenty of oxygen, a large heat exchanger, and could accommodate coolant pumps. The Skylab Program Office 
charged CTSD to design a system that used the spacecraft capabilities, and could perform both the EVA tasks, as 
well as EVA simulations in the OWS. They ultimately selected the resulting system called the ALSA. 
The ALSA was an umbilical-based approach, and the umbilicals were 60 feet long. They were stowed in 
spherical “blisters,” attached to the exterior of the airlock module, and accessed through openings in the wall. 
Oxygen was supplied from the vehicle at 100 psi, and regulated to suit pressure through redundant demand 
regulators. Various sizes of outlet orifices could be selected to get more or less ventilating flow. Cooling was 
achieved by recirculating coolant to and from the suit through the umbilical. An Apollo-type cooling garment was 
used. The coolant was chilled by a vehicle-based heat exchanger, and pumped through the umbilical by vehicle-
based pumps. A leg-mounted, automatically activated, two-bottle oxygen package provided 30 minutes of 
emergency oxygen. 
 
a. Results 
The umbilical-based life-support system of Skylab and the modified Apollo spacesuit were intended to be a 
“work-horse” assembly that would perform such mundane tasks as changing out film canisters and brushing dirt and 
debris from experimental camera lenses. This dramatically changed when the Skylab 1 vehicle lost much of its 
insulation and solar power because of a malfunction during launch. EVA was used to help recover the OWS, and 
with it, the Skylab program. This use of EVA was a harbinger of the extensive EVA operations used to repair and 
service the Hubble Space Telescope in the ensuing space shuttle program. 
The remaining Skylab EVAs were all successful, but an interesting situation arose. The umbilicals required 
constant attention by one of the two EVA crewmembers to avoid tangling and snagging. In fact, umbilical 
management required almost all of one of the EVA crewmember’s time. 
 
6. Shuttle 
Before the Apollo XI Moon landing in 1969, NASA began early studies of space shuttle designs. In 1969, 
President Richard Nixon formed the Space Task Group, chaired by Vice President Spiro T. Agnew. This group 
evaluated the shuttle concept studies to date, and recommended a national space strategy including building a space 
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shuttle. The goal, as presented by NASA to Congress, was to provide a much less-expensive means of access to 
space for NASA, the Department of Defense, and other commercial and scientific users.  
The shuttle program was formally launched on January 5, 1972, when President Nixon announced that NASA 
would proceed with the development of a reusable space shuttle system. The stated goals of "transforming the space 
frontier...into familiar territory, easily accessible for human endeavor" was to be achieved by launching as many as 
50 missions per year, with hopes of driving down per-mission costs.
20, 21
 When the spacesuit system was developed 
for the shuttle program, it was the first time the spacesuit and integrated PLSS were primarily designed for 
extravehicular use and not as a backup system during the loss of cabin pressure, as did Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo 
suits. The design of a backup suit system was delegated to a separate “launch-entry” suit configuration whose basic 
design was based on a military high-altitude pressure suit. 
 
a. Results 
Skylab resulted from Apollo, but shuttle represented a new start, especially with the spacesuit systems.   
Instead of the Apollo spacesuit custom-fit, multi-sized spacesuits were built to accommodate a variety of crew 
sizes as well as both sexes. The life-support system, though schematically similar to that of Apollo, was much more 
densely packaged and designed for multiple usages over a 15-year life span, rather than the single-mission use of the 
Apollo backpacks. 
 Shuttle existed simultaneously with the ISS, with space-suited men and women assembling the station, as well 
as servicing shuttle-based payloads such as the Hubble Space Telescope. 
 
7. International Space Station 
The evolution of a permanent space station orbiting in LEO, and subsequently the completed ISS, has had a 
variety of independent concepts, design studies, and development activities that began in the early 1960s and 
continued over the following 20 years. In May 1982, NASA administrator James Beggs formally commissioned a 
NASA task force to study the proposal for a space station for 14 months. A broad community of prospective users or 
potential customers of this proposed space-based system provided inputs to this task force. These participants 
included the science applications community, potential international partners, the Department of Defense, the 
potential commercial community, and other interested government agencies.  
The early plans for a space station were embodied in the concept for Space Station Freedom (SSF). It was to be a 
dual-keel affair, cost $14.5 billion, and be in orbit by 1994.
22
 This approach proved to be too costly and went 
through a series of revisions to become what is now the ISS. 
The ISS is a modular structure whose first component was launched in 1998. The ISS is a microgravity and 
space environment research laboratory in which crewmembers conduct experiments in biology, human biology, 
physics, astronomy, meteorology, and other fields. The station is suited to test spacecraft systems and equipment 
required for missions to the Moon and Mars. 
Decision makers chose the extensive use of EVA to assemble and maintain the space station. A series of 
advanced, higher-operating pressure spacesuit concepts (e.g., AX-5 hard suit and MK III hybrid suit) had been 
designed, developed, and tested to support space station activities. A severe funding shortage discontinued the 
advanced suit development activities. The highly successful operational capability demonstrated by the shuttle EMU 
spacesuit system caused the ISS program to adopt a modified form of the shuttle EMU (along with the Russian 
Orlan spacesuit system) to support its planned orbital extravehicular operations. 
 In the aggregate, the ISS program consists of a complex set of legal, political, and financial agreements between 
the 15 nations involved in the project, governing ownership of the various components, rights to crewing and use, 
and responsibilities for crew rotation and station resupply. These agreements unite the five space agencies and their 
respective ISS programs and govern how they interact with each other daily to maintain station operations, from 
traffic control of spacecraft to and from the station, to use of space and crew time. These agencies anticipate that this 
partnership will potentially have an impact on future spacesuit legacy factors.
23
 
The ISS, which was finished in 2011, has a truss length of 357.5 feet and cost over $100 billion to complete.
24, 25 
 
a. Results 
There were 162 EVAs performed, totaling 1021 hours, to assemble the ISS.
26
 Astronauts will continue EVAs to 
maintain the ISS throughout its lifespan. The continuing successful servicing of ISS systems and structural 
components by EVA astronauts is living testimony to the successful incorporation of lessons learned from previous 
programs, and the accumulation of more experience will serve future programs. 
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B. Technical Requirements 
Having identified the program objectives, detailed technical requirements follow. Program requirements define 
the need for a type of spacesuit system; technical requirements expand this into a system-specific functionality. 
The technical requirements probably influence reliability, durability, cost, schedule, and performance of a 
product more than any other influence. The closer a program can get to the end-of-the-program requirements at the 
outset of the program, the more likely the program is to be successful. However, program requirements can result in 
technical requirements that can have negative impacts to meeting the program’s needs.   
The Apollo Spacesuit Assembly, or SSA, offered some examples of the effects of early requirements on the 
subsequent activities of the program.  The SSA was composed of all the anthropomorphic elements of the spacesuit 
plus the helmet and visor. Because of the perceptionthat SSA development had to precede that of the spacecraft, the 
SSA became a “rapid start” requirement. Because of a set of under-developed technical requirements, the program 
had designed, manufactured, certified and chamber-tested an SSA before discovering the requirements were 
incorrect or inadequate. The most significant output of the first 17 months of the SSA contracted effort was that an 
acceptable SSA configuration was yet to be determined. That effort revealed SSA limitations,  which resulted in 
multiple parallel spacesuit efforts. The eventual configurations and providers of the fundamental spacesuit 
technologies and flight items resulted from competition.
27
  
All the desirable characteristics for a spacesuit will always exceed what can be effectively packaged in one suit-
system. Also, some desirable characteristics may conflict with others or not be feasible. For example, the Apollo 
SSA program started with a requirement that the SSA was to protect an astronaut from lunar ejecta (falling debris 
from a meteor impact). NASA wanted astronauts to remain safe and operational if a meteor struck nearby. However, 
ejecta from a meteor impact could hurtle debris vast distances into space. The particles that failed to reach orbital 
velocity would be drawn back to the surface by lunar gravity. Without an atmosphere to slow the return, such 
returning debris would reach supersonic velocities. Early in the program, NASA questioned the ability to meet the 
requirement. Experimentation indicated “body armor” consisting of wrought aluminum plates 0.150 inch thick 
would be required to provide adequate protection.  
After a well-meaning desire has become a technical requirement, it is difficult to remove. The ejecta requirement 
lasted over three years into the program, whose name by then had changed from SSA to Apollo EMU. The adoption 
of the term EMU recognized the role of the Portable Life Support System, OPS, and RCU co-existing with the SSA, 
which completes the extravehicular assembly. The ejecta hazard was recognized as applying to the life support 
elements, as well as to the SSA. Defining an acceptable probabilistic assessment of risk resulted in the acceptance of 
a lower level of protection. 
The development process provides technical requirement validation and refinement. This process is not limited 
to the activities within the program. In Apollo, the challenges in developing the lunar module (LM) to reaching its 
launch weight, caused the LM to “shrink,” thus compressing the Apollo EMU front to back dimension.   
With shuttle, the selection of vehicle cabin pressure caused a significant impact. NASA wanted to avoid the 
expense of designing, developing, and certifying a new EMU for shuttle or to minimize the expense to the extent 
possible. NASA recognized the PLSS to be the greatest single expense in the EMU. NASA wanted to reuse the 
already designed, certified, and proven reliable Apollo schematic design to the extent possible. At the start of shuttle 
EMU development, NASA planned the shuttle cabin to be capable of reduction from the nominal pressure of 14.7 
psid to 9.0 psid. With a revision of EMU nominal suit pressure from the 3.7 psid used on Apollo to 4.0 psid, 
extensive oxygen prebreathing before performing an EVA could be avoided while providing minimum risk of 
exposure to decompression sickness (DCS). The shuttle EMU reached certification before the shuttle vehicle was 
built. The vehicle program developed safety concerns regarding oxygen percentages needed to implement the 9.0 
psid pressure option. The oxygen partial pressure levels were sufficiently high, which raised flammability safety 
concerns. The vehicle settled on a pressure of 10.2 psid, requiring the EMU operating pressure to be increased to 4.3 
psid to minimize the danger of DCS (the “bends”). The implementation of this requirement occurred during EMU 
certification. To avoid a complete redesign of the EMU, the pressure operating requirements for all the PLSS field 
replaceable items were compressed toward a slightly higher pressure operation range. While this minimized the 
EMU program expense and schedule to complete certification, this caused scores of anomaly investigations through 
the subsequent decades of the EMU use with components marginally failing requirements. The costs associated with 
the investigations and the resulting attempts at corrective actions added expense that far exceeded the savings during 
certification.  
In a bizarre instance of “déjà vu”, the shuttle EMU front-to-back dimension was constrained, as it had been 
during Apollo, because of vehicle considerations. During shuttle, a requirement was added for an astronaut to be 
able to access the flight deck from the mid-deck in a pressurized suit.  
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This requirement arose from a proposed scenario during which an orbiter that was stranded in orbit would be 
rescued by a second orbiter. As part of this rescue, it was supposed that the disabled orbiter had to be depressurized 
to allow the rescue crew to enter and traverse through the mid deck to the flight deck. The interdeck opening 
required that the EMU be no “thicker” than 19-3/4 inches. The vehicle deck opening concept design necessitated 
that the EMU had to translate through this passage; therefore, the EMU had to absorb the brunt of the requirement. 
This resulted in the front-mounted displays and control module being compressed in thickness. This compression 
resulted in difficulty reading the displays and easily reaching and activating controls. Legends and labels identifying 
front-mounted controls were printed in mirror-image configuration, allowing the crewmember to read them in a 
wrist-mounted mirror. Coincidentally, the perceived need to allow pressurized access into the flight deck from the 
mid-deck was based on a postulated scenario involving recue of a disabled (and depressurized) orbiter, from which 
the crew and passengers had been removed by means of rescue performed by another orbiter. The requirement 
ended because NASA determined that the worst-case time required to return a “stacked” orbiter from the launch 
pad, destow the payload, put a rescue kit onboard, return to the launch pad, and launch could take up to a year. The 
deminsion requirement was challenged later because of the need to accommodate an increased capacity battery and 
the regenerable carbon dioxide removal canister. This resulted in the EMU program removing the front-to-back 
constraint 
The importance of a development phase cannot be overemphasized. When the JSC CTSD managers proposed 
their shuttle EMU Life Support System budget to NASA Headquarters (HQ), NASA HQ rejected having a 
development unit. The JSC contingent argued that being able to complete the certification-type test program on a 
prototype unit would provide maximum assurance that certification testing on the more closely controlled (and 
therefore more expensive) production configuration would be successful. NASA HQ stated their belief that the 
certification effort would be successful without the cost of a development program. The result was that the first 
production unit, the certification unit, underwent a series of failures and subsequent redesigns, all with the 
accompanying formality that drove costs and jeopardized the development schedule. The certification unit became 
an expensive development unit. In retrospect, the JSC argument should have been based on the need to first prove 
that the item could be built, then test it. 
In summary, the message received from past spacesuit programs is that program requirements and the ensuing 
technical requirements exert a tremendous influence–positive or negative–on both design and the conduct of the 
program. It is very difficult–sometimes almost impossible–to expunge the effects of an early requirement that may 
have been deleted. But the area of requirements definition and implementation is only one, albeit an important, 
contributor to the profile of a program as it progresses. There are numerous other influencing factors that exert a 
tremendous power over configuration and operations. The next section explores some of these other influencing 
factors as they have been experienced in past spacesuit programs.   
C. Influencing Factors 
The set of factors influencing a program can be varied. For instance, the perceived Russian "threat" to get to the 
Moon before the United States was probably the overwhelming reason NASA went to the Moon. The goals of 
increasing scientific knowledge and partaking in the adventure of exploration of an entirely new regime were minor 
compared to the United States’ national Cold War paranoia, which was not unreasonable at the time. 28 
In addition to national goals, there are other significant factors that influence the course of a program. These 
factors tend to emerge in the conceptual stage of the program and continue throughout the duration of the effort. 
Some important factors in past spacesuit system programs include leadership personalities and their critical decision 
making capabilities, conflicts among organizations, unforeseen events that often can occur during the effort, 
implementing reusability of spacesuit systems, the dominance of schedule adherence, and the checks and balances 
that a program follows.   
No program proceeds as it was initially planned; factors from failures to changes in the political environment 
will alter not only configurations, but ultimate goals as well. The following discussions of various influencing forces 
is by no means the only portrayal of these factors, but these have been selected because they had profound effects on 
past spacesuit systems.  
 
1. Leadership 
Regarding leadership, it is tempting to stay in the stratosphere when addressing the effects of leadership on past 
programs. John F. Kennedy, along with early NASA administrator James Webb and others in executive positions, 
were instrumental in setting the goals and guiding the agency. However, there were individuals at much lower levels 
who had enormous impacts on the execution of past spacesuit system programs. 
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In the early days of Project Mercury, Richard (Dick) S. Johnston came from the Bureau of Aeronautics in 
Washington, D.C., and joined NASA in 1959. When he was told that NASA was going to use the David Clark Air 
Force suit for Project Mercury, he dissented and arranged formal, manned evaluations at Wright Patterson Air Force 
Base in Dayton, Ohio, and the Naval Air Crew Equipment Laboratory in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, which resulted 
in the selection of the U.S. Navy (B.F. Goodrich) suit over the International Latex Corporation (ILC) and David 
Clark Suits.
29, 30
 Johnston was a deputy branch chief in Life Systems Division (now CTSD) in 1959. In his NASA 
oral history interview he stated:  “Working on the Mercury program was like going into a candy shop. There was 
(sic) so many things you could do. You just had to say, ‘I’ll do them’.”31 In addition to suits, he was responsible for 
spacecraft environmental control system, NASA’s animal program, and the bioinstrumentation program. Johnston 
eventually became chief of the Crew Systems Division (precursor of CTSD) in 1963. Johnston was an enthusiastic 
and inspirational leader, and he took great interest in the development of those whom he led. He once told his 
project engineers that he wanted them to “take a ride” on their hardware, to gain the user’s perspective.   
The Gemini program was formed to prove equipment and techniques for rendezvous and docking to support the 
Apollo program
.32
 Suits were required for the Gemini missions’ safety, which were to reach a 14-day duration. 
NASA first investigated two partial-don versions (i.e., the B. F. Goodrich and Arrowhead suits had removable arm 
and leg portions to enhance crewmember comfort). However, the Gemini suit ultimately selected was one David 
Clark Corp. built, and did not have the partial-don feature.  
John Flagg was the president of David Clark Corp., and was a dynamic leader. Under his direction, David Clark 
Corp. built a suit with the company’s own funding. David Clark Corp. essentially came in “off the street” and easily 
won the competition. Flagg became quite famous among the NASA contracts personnel, since he had a practice of 
not claiming costs for changes to which he was entitled to remuneration.  
EVA was proposed as a secondary objective for the Gemini program. As stated previously, the Gemini 
program’s primary objective was to develop and prove equipment and techniques for rendezvous to support Apollo. 
The Gemini contract (NAS 9-170) was awarded after that of Apollo (NAS 9-150).   
The selection of individual ejection seats with the accompanying full-opening doors for emergency escape 
during launch for the Gemini program was a departure from the escape tower approach of Mercury and Apollo. In 
those programs, the entire crew module would be separated from the booster by rockets mounted on a tower. If not 
used, the tower was automatically separated after the risk was over. 
The full-opening doors of the Gemini spacecraft were a natural portal for accessing space. However, extensive 
modifications to the suit and helmet were needed including the suit’s extra isolative layers and the helmet visor’s 
protection from ultraviolet (UV) and infra-red radiation.   
A life-support system was also required. NASA contracted with AirResearch (now a part of Honeywell) for an 
umbilical-fed chest pack. The first umbilical EVA was planned for Gemini VI (scheduled for the latter part of 1966) 
with the AirResearch system; however, Russian cosmonaut Aleksey Leonov’s EVA, on March 18, 1965, caused 
NASA to revisit their previous EVA plans.   
NASA planned a potential “stand-up” EVA for Gemini IV, scheduled for early June 1965. This was to be 
accomplished by adding extension hoses to the environmental control system, eliminating a full extravehicular life-
support system. By opening one of the doors, a crewmember could stand up in the spacecraft and extend into space. 
However, this would require the suit and helmet changes discussed above; therefore, the necessary modifications to 
the Gemini suit had already been initiated.   
The importance of the stand-up EVA extended to the vehicle interior systems, since they would be exposed to 
space, and this would be an opportunity to determine the accuracy of the test and analyses performed. Positive 
results would “open the door” for future EVAs. However, the Gemini-IV stand-up EVA plans were overtaken by 
events related to Leonov’s EVA, and this exercise was never performed on Gemini IV. 
In response to the challenge of the Russian EVA, James (Jim) V. Correale, branch chief of the Gemini Support 
Office in Crew Systems Division, convened a meeting on March 26, 1965, to investigate how NASA could perform 
an umbilical EVA on Gemini IV, less than three months away. Correale had come to NASA from the Navy’s Air 
Crew Equipment Laboratory in Philadelphia. Correale was an innovator, and experienced in pressure suits. He was 
convinced that NASA could conduct a safe and productive EVA on Gemini IV. To this end, he selected Larry E. 
Bell to lead a tiger team to design, build, and test a life-support system to perform in conjunction with the suit. He 
was a practical engineer, with a natural ability to summon the best efforts from those under his leadership. The team 
successfully designed, built, and tested an umbilical-type life-support system to accommodate the suit. White 
successfully performed the first U.S. EVA, conducting a 36-minute sortie on June 3, 1965. 
Anticipating comfort problems during the planned 14-day Gemini VII mission, the crew petitioned NASA 
management to let them wear standard U.S. Air Force flight suits with medical monitoring instrumentation, helmets, 
and oxygen masks. This configuration had been successfully evaluated in altitude chamber testing at McDonnell 
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(now Boeing) in their St. Louis, Missouri plant. However, the possibility of the crew being exposed to high cabin 
temperatures, or being exposed to a sudden cabin decompression ruled against such an approach. Correale suggested 
a light-weight version of the intravehicular suit, and David Clark Corp. met the challenge and fabricated a 16-lb 
“get-me-down” suit, as Correale and others dubbed it. The suit was successfully flown on Gemini VII. 
After Gemini IV, the Gemini EVA missions were Gemini IX-A, Gemini X, Gemini XI, and Gemini XII. The 
Gemini IX-A mission was to feature a tethered EVA by an EVA crewmember wearing the U.S. Air Force Astronaut 
Maneuvering Unit (AMU). This was a backpack containing a thruster system using hydrogen peroxide, and carrying 
oxygen to supply the chestpack in place of the umbilical. Because of inadequate foot restraints, the crewmember was 
unable to release the AMU control arms, causing him to expend enormous amounts of energy, overpowering the 
chestpack cooling system, and partially blinding him temporarily with perspiration. 
Gemini X had a shortened EVA because of too little spacecraft maneuvering fuel, and Gemini XI challenges 
were a repeat of Gemini IX-A. The EVA crewmember expended tremendous amounts of energy attempting to attach 
a collar to an antenna boom at the front of the vehicle.   
Gemini XII had originally been slated to use the AMU in free-flight. Gemini program manager Charles W. 
“Chuck” Mathews opposed this, and the mission plans were scaled back to focus on adequate foot restraints, 
moderating the workload, and investigating various types of spacesuit glove-accommodating connectors and tools. 
Newly instituted neutral buoyancy training had been used, and NASA thought this would better prepare the EVA 
crewmember for what he would encounter in zero-gravity. 
Mathews was deceptively low-key in manner and appearance. He would patiently listen for hours to competing 
ideas and presentations during the critical flight readiness reviews (FRR), and render a decision. The Gemini XII 
FRR was tense because this was the last Gemini mission and the last opportunity for NASA to know if challenges to 
training crewmembers and controlling workloads had been resolved. During one part of the briefing, an advocate of 
stainless-steel hook and loop fastener material passed around samples of the material while he extolled its virtues. 
Mathews took a sample of the hook material and rubbed it across his pants leg. The stainless steel shredded his 
pants, and then everyone speculated about what it might do to the pressure retention characteristics of gloves. 
Mathews patiently, but firmly, deleted that material from consideration. It was this ability to subjugate personal 
feelings to the current task that made him one of the great managers. 
 
2. Conflict Between Organizations 
In the early 1960s, NASA’s Life Support Division (precursor to Crew Systems Division, now named CTSD) had 
initiated various pressure-suit studies that lead to the preliminary prototype suits that numerous contactors 
developed. When the official proposal for an Apollo spacesuit was released in 1962, many teams of contactors 
submitted responses. One team, composed of Hamilton Standard Division (HSD) of United Aircraft Corporation, 
offered the PLSS, with David Clark, Company (DCC) providing the spacesuit garment. Another team was led by 
ILC who was the proposed pressure garment contractor, and included Westinghouse Corporation for life support. 
NASA selected the concept for the PLSS from HSD  and the pressure suit garment concept from the competing 
ILC team. NASA chose Hamilton Standard as the prime contractor for the entire SSA with the condition that they 
team with ILC to be the spacesuit garment supplier. Unfortunately, this forced a collaboration that created many 
unforeseen problems. Many times, this was complicated by NASA becoming involved directly with ILC, instead of 
going through Hamilton, as the prime contractor. The Apollo suit program was rife with management personality 
clashes, coupled with cost overruns and an extensive series of prototype spacesuit configurations from multiple 
organizations. While the first three years of the program produced the base configurations of the pressure suit and 
life-support system that were used on the Moon, the effort proved HSD and ILC were unable to work together. 
NASA functionally assumed the role of spacesuit integrator in September 1965. Lingering contractual issues 
resulted in NASA formally gaining the role in March 1966.  
 
3. Unforeseen Events 
Unforeseen events, especially those that are catastrophic, always cause change, and NASA has had many. The 
Apollo 1 fire in January 1967, caused a complete revision of spacesuit external materials. The Skylab emergency on 
May 14, 1973, illustrated the importance of having EVA. The shuttle EMU fire of April 18, 1980, caused a 
sweeping redesign of the EMU’s oxygen systems. Two unrelated EMU failures in different EMUs during STS-5 in 
November 1982 caused extensive redesign of the EMU ventilating fan and increased quality control in oxygen 
regulator assembly. The shuttle program’s Challenger disaster in January 1986, resulted in redesign of spacesuit 
rotating joints. The Columbia disaster on February 1, 2003, although it did not have a direct impact on spacesuit 
systems, it did have an indirect effect by demonstrating how EVA could be a significant benefit to spaceflight. 
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a. The Apollo 1 Fire 
The Apollo 1 fire occurred on January 27, 1967, during launch pad testing using pure oxygen at greater-than-
atmospheric pressure. As a result of this catastrophic event, which claimed the lives of all three crewmembers, all 
Apollo program efforts stood down for a comprehensive safety review.  
Richard (Dick) S. Johnston, the chief of Crew Systems Division (now CTSD), immediately flew to Cape 
Canaveral, now the KSC, to aid in the Apollo fire investigation.  According to Johnston’s oral history account, when 
he returned from the Cape, he assembled his division. In his words he said, “ ‘Look, we're going to straighten this 
out.  We're going to do what we have to do about new materials. We're just going to straighten this out.’ And we 
did.”33 
While well intentioned, this was a goal without an immediate means of implementation. However, also after the 
fire, JSC’s deputy director George M. Low managed the Apollo program. Johnston was impressed that Low sent a 
hand-written memo to him every morning about the investigation. Low expected more from the investigation than 
just materials being reviewed and less flammable replacements found. He directed that all potential failure modes be 
reexamined and analyzed for risk reduction. Additionally, all previous anomalies were to be reviewed to determine 
if their corrective actions were sufficiently robust to preclude reoccurrence. This approach to anomalies continued 
for the duration of the program. 
The investigation of the Apollo 1 fire resulted in several key recommendations, one of which stated that: “The 
amount and location of combustible materials in the Command Module (CM) must be severely restricted and 
controlled.”34 This recommendation affected nearly every Apollo CM subsystem by initiating a search for flame 
retardant, non-metallic materials, including that which was used to design the suits. 
This search for new materials elevated a unique personality in Crew Systems Division (eventually CTSD) to 
prominence. Matthew (Matt) Igor Radnofsky was an acknowledged world expert in non-metallic materials, and had 
a wide variety of contacts in government and industry. He had overwhelming energy and drive. He demonstrated an 
amazing ability to focus a variety of resources on a specific task, and ultimately achieve success. 
After the Apollo I disaster, Radnofsky was the focal point for the development of fire-resistant spacesuit 
materials, with the necessary degree of comfort and functionality. He began this task with his customary energy, and 
soon had a spate of candidate materials. Radnofsky was enthusiastic about each one–there was a running joke that he 
had a “material of the week” to take to the weekly division staff meeting. Because of the combined efforts of 
government and industry, which he led, fire-resistant materials such as Polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) -coated glass 
fiber cloth and other flame-resistant spacesuit materials were developed and successfully used in Apollo and 
subsequent programs. 
The stand-down after the Apollo CM fire and the subsequent quality reviews paid dividends.  Preflight pressure 
suit testing for Apollo 7 went smoothly, as did the testing before Apollo 8. Unlike the Apollo EMU testing in 
January 1967, the complete EMU chamber testing that preceded the flight of Apollo 9 was amazingly uneventful. 
The first Apollo EVA occurred on March 6, 1969. It lasted 46 minutes. Russell L. Schweickart and David R. Scott 
simultaneously emerged from the LM and CM, respectively. Scott went EVA from the CM using an umbilical for 
life support. Schweickart’s EMU was in lunar EVA configuration using the backpack life-support system. The 
absence of anomalies became the new Apollo EMU norm, which resulted in lunar surface operations being well 
supported. 
 
b. The Skylab Emergency 
The Skylab program is a good example of how ”unforeseen factors” may affect a program’s outcome. The 
Skylab program was the U.S. version of a modest space station. Modified Apollo suits were to be used for Skylab 
EVA, along with an umbilical that provided circulating water for crewmember cooling in addition to oxygen, 
electrical power, communication, and instrumentation. EVA was used for film retrieval and other such tasks until 
the near-catastrophic loss of one solar wing and insulation from the OWS occurred during the Skylab 1 vehicle 
launch on May 14, 1973. The vehicle’s temperature rose and all of its power was robbed because of the loss of half 
the solar-powered electrical system and failure of the remaining solar wing to deploy. This event essentially 
rendered the OWS, in which the crew was to live and work, potentially uninhabitable. 
A series of EVAs was proposed to free the jammed solar wing. Additionally, some means were needed to shield 
the uninsulated section of the OWS from direct sunlight. Failure to solve any one of these problems doomed the 
program. Teams at JSC, and Marshall Spaceflight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, worked around the clock for two 
weeks during May 1973. During these intensive two weeks, both management and technical personnel ‘rolled up’ 
their respective sleeves and worked side-by-side in the design, development, fabrication, and testing of the umbrella-
like sun-shade concept that astronauts deployed on the following Skylab 2 mission. As a result, they perfected the 
tools and techniques successfully used to free the jammed solar wing. 
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During the fast-paced two weeks, the NASA head of the Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance (SR&QA) 
Division, which levies a strict set of requirements for the design, development, and fabrication of space-flight 
hardware said, “Waive all requirements, just make the damn thing work.”   
The human cost of this intense effort might best be illustrated by an example. Charles (Charlie) C. Lutz had 
joined Life Systems Division (now CTSD) after leaving the life support group at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.  
Lutz was extremely knowledgeable, intelligent, and a self-taught expert in pressure suits and non-metallic materials. 
He was made a branch chief of the suits and life-support systems of Skylab–an incredible achievement for someone 
without a college degree. As branch chief, he could have elected to stay above the fray, so to speak, but he left his 
office and helped the “troops” develop the EVA tools and execute planning for the Skylab vehicle rescue. The team 
worked horrendous hours, and Lutz’s participation was equal to anyone’s, even though he was a much older than 
many of the team members. Approximately a week or 10 days into the team’s activities, Lutz was leaving CTSD 
Building 7A one evening. After traveling a few steps away from the door into the drive, he collapsed from fatigue. 
There were no lingering after-effects and he returned to his job without any loss of ability, but this graphic picture of 
dedication was typical of this team’s effort. 
  There was a bit of center-to-center rivalry involved in the Skylab recovery operations, however. JSC developed 
the umbrella, or parasol, deployed through a scientific airlock. Since the entire Skylab emergency had its origin in 
the failure of the micrometeoroid and insulation shield that swept off one solar wing of the OWS, which was a 
Marshall Spaceflight Center responsibility, the Marshall organization wanted a more definitive role in determining 
the solution to the loss of insulation, and the long-term viability of the OWS. The JSC umbrella, or parasol, was 
supplanted by a larger Marshall Spaceflight Center-designed twin-pole sunshade, deployed on Skylab 3 by 
astronauts during EVA. 
Although the 84-day on-orbit stay time of Skylab 4 is perhaps the program’s best-remembered achievement, the 
dramatic role of EVA saving the OWS, and with it the $24,0000,000 Skylab program, is perhaps its most important 
legacy–a legacy that influenced the oncoming shuttle program. 
The shuttle program represented a significant departure from previous programs. Initially, EVA on shuttle was 
considered to be optional. The necessary airlock and spacesuit systems were to be part of a “kit,” which could be 
manifested or demanifested at will. After the lessons of Skylab, however, EVA became firmly entrenched in the 
shuttle program. A presentation slide was distributed at JSC, bearing a picture of the crippled Skylab OWS with its 
single deployed solar array and the parasol and a caption that read:  “EVA – Would You Want to Fly Without It?” 
 
c. The EMU Fire 
The examples discussed above involved events that essentially affected the spacesuit system from without; 
however, the shuttle EMU fire of April 18, 1980, affected the spacesuit system from within. During this occurrence, 
one technician was burned over much of his body, and a second technician received burns to one hand. The fire 
originated in a 6000-psi oxygen system, and almost completely destroyed the EMU. A sweeping redesign of the 
high-pressure and lower-pressure (900 psi) EMU oxygen systems was performed, and a comprehensive NASA 
specification for the design, cleaning, materials selection, and testing of high-pressure oxygen systems was 
generated.
35
 As a result of the monumental effort that Hamilton-Standard (now United Technologies Corporation 
Aerospace Systems (UTAS)) and NASA performed, the redesigns were certified and the April 12, 1981, STS-1 
launch date was held.   
 
d. EMU In-flight Anomalies on STS-5 
Another spacesuit-related event that profoundly affected the program was the occurrence of dual, unrelated 
failures of both EMUs carried aboard STS-5 in November 1982. STS-5 was to have seen the first EVA of the shuttle 
program; however, one EMU’s ventilation fan failed to reach required operating speed, thus not providing enough 
flow to wash expired carbon dioxide from the helmet. One other aspect of the low speed was to cause interference 
with the communication system. The second EMU’s oxygen regulator failed to reach required suit pressure. If an 
EVA to close failed payload bay doors had been necessary, it would have required mission controllers and the crew 
to make a difficult decision. Post-flight analysis showed that the regulator was stable at a value that would have been 
life-sustaining, but a slight decay of pressure in flight could have caused simultaneous oxygen withdrawal from the 
secondary, or backup oxygen system.
36, 37
 The regulator anomaly was traced to the omission of thread-locking 
inserts in the regulator adjustment mechanism.   
The problem with the ventilation fan in the other defective EMU was corrosion from moisture intrusion in the 
speed-sensing components-magnetic Hall-effect sensors. Coincidentally, some months previous, during an altitude 
chamber run at JSC, an identical ventilating fan had suddenly shut down, but was easily restarted, albeit attaining a 
lower speed than previous. The speed was still within the allowable tolerance, and it was deemed too expensive and 
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risky to disassemble the fan’s motor; therefore, the suspect fan was relegated to non-flight service. After STS-5, this 
previous instance was reviewed. The fan motor was disassembled, and corrosion was found–less corrosion than in 
the one that failed in flight, but significant nonetheless. The warning had been given during that earlier chamber run, 
but ignored. 
The regulator needed no redesign, only a sharpening of procedures and verification. The ventilation fan motor 
was eventually housed in a “can,” the Hall sensors were hermetically sealed, and allowable levels of drift were 
periodically verified. 
 
e. The Challenger Disaster 
On January 28, 1986, 73 seconds into flight, the Challenger vehicle was lost because of failure of an O-ring seal 
in one of the launch vehicle’s solid rocket boosters.38 The effects of the shuttle Challenger disaster affected the 
spacesuit program differently from past disasters. The virtual shutdown of the flight program after January 1986, 
resulted in all Orbiter systems engineers performing an exhaustive review of design, materials selection, 
certification, checkout, and operations. For the spacesuit system, the governing repository of information resided in 
two critical program documents: the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and the Critical Items List (CIL). 
The FMEA revealed whether certain levels of redundancy were present, and identified where single-point failures 
existed. The CIL then took those components that were in violation of the criteria, and attempted to show by design 
margin, certification, checkouts, and operational procedures that the item was considered to be safe, even though the 
strict criteria of the program were not met. The CIL essentially constituted a voluminous waiver for the spacesuit 
system for many single-point failures. Without the waiver mechanism provided by the CIL, the necessary degrees of 
redundancy to meet strict program requirements would have rendered the suits too heavy to launch and too 
cumbersome for the crew to operate.   
When the Challenger-based re-evaluation occurred, spacesuit systems’ engineers and designers decided that all 
rotating bearings in the suit should be redesigned to feature redundant pressure seals, rather than the single seal 
previously used. This would significantly reduce the number of single-point failure conditions in the suit. The EVA 
life-support system was also reviewed, with 1600 design changes being thoroughly scrutinized. Some “holes” in 
certification were also found (i.e., certain practices were being performed for which a requirement had never been 
levied, therefore, no certification tests were performed). An example was the practice of lifting the “short EMU”–the 
hard upper torso (HUT) and arms, with the life support backpack and displays and control module attached by 
means of a circular plate with an eye bolt latched into the neck ring connector normally used for the helmet. 
Fortunately, calculations and tests showed that the 200 plus pounds of weight did not overtax the connector and its 
junction at the HUT. 
 
f. The Columbia Disaster 
On February 1, 2003, the spacecraft Columbia disintegrated during entry, causing the loss of all seven 
crewmembers. The contributing cause was the loss of thermal protection tile from the left wing, caused by a piece of 
foam from the launch vehicle external tank impacting it during launch.
39
 The Columbia accident review board 
recommended that NASA develop a means of inspecting and then repairing damaged tiles. While the inspection was 
determined to be possible by use of the shuttle’s remote manipulator arm outfitted with a camera, the means of 
repair was demonstrated by a pair of EVA astronauts on STS-123, launched on March 11, 2008. The crew 
successfully squirted a repair material mixture onto some pre-damaged tile samples during the fourth EVA of that 
mission.
40
 
 
g. Reusability   
The concept of spacesuit system reusability was an enormous change from past programs. Apollo had featured 
custom-designed suits for specific astronauts. Full-body casts were used to define the exact sizing required. It was a 
strange sight to view an astronaut clad from neck to feet with plaster-of-paris, leaving only the extremities bare. For 
shuttle, the spacesuit system was to be made of various-sized suit elements, to allow a suit to be “built” by selecting 
the right sizes from “bins.” There was to be another significant difference in the shuttle suit. Jim Correale, at this 
time chief of CTSD, had a vivid memory of seeing Apollo astronauts falling down on the lunar surface (e.g., 
astronaut Harrison (Jack) Schmitt during Apollo 17). Correale vowed that no suit would ever have exposed hoses, 
such as was the case for the Apollo EMU. Consequently, the shuttle EMU featured a suit that joined directly to the 
backpack, with all fluid passages at the junction.    
Correale also determined that the upper torso of the suit was to be “hard,” to provide more protection against loss 
of pressure because of puncture. This was a significant departure from the all-fabric construction of all flight 
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spacesuits to date. The HUT was first built as an aluminum prototype, and the production versions were made of 
multilayer fiberglass, covered with multi-layer insulation.  
The life support backpack, although schematically similar to that of Apollo, featured much more dense 
packaging and subsystems that were designed and certified to last as long as 15 years. An unforeseen benefit 
emerged when many backpack components and subsystems were certified for much longer times to allow current 
use on the ISS. 
 
h. Schedule Adherence 
One of the common aspects of past programs was the dominance of adherence to a set schedule. President 
Kennedy’s challenge to land a man on the Moon and return him safely to Earth before the end of the decade of the 
1960s is perhaps the best known and most often quoted; however, schedule adherence and the consequences of 
slippage were always uppermost in the minds of engineers and managers in all past programs. The additional burden 
of adhering to cost and guaranteeing performance completed the triad of sometimes conflicting requirements for 
these engineers and managers.    
This environment gave rise to a type of management style that might be termed the “Military Paradigm.” The 
characteristics of this paradigm include a dictatorial approach to managing employees, no tolerance for failure to 
meet deadlines, rapid and draconian action, and a personally intimidating manner. Although successful in the short 
term, this management style inevitably leads to discontent and eventual loss of employees.  
Both NASA and Hamilton-Standard (now UTAS) have had practitioners of this management style during the 
Apollo and shuttle programs. Although the present environment does not reflect a schedule-driven milieu, when a 
hard schedule is mandated, it is almost inevitable that the Military Paradigm will resurface. 
 
4. Checks and Balances 
In the world of spacesuit systems’ design, development, testing, and in-flight use, the schedule, cost, and 
technical performance pressures inevitably resulted in conflict between engineering, management, safety, contracts, 
configuration management, and other disciplines. The emergence of program change boards became the focal point 
for resolution of issues between parties, as well as authorizing changes to the program. These top-level boards had 
authoritative representation from multiple stakeholders, such as engineering, program office, safety, quality 
assurance, reliability, the medical community, flight operations, and the crew.   
The efficacy of the change board as a check and balance resulted from the dedication of the various disciplines to 
decisively represent their area, and thus present the chairman with “pure” input to make an informed decision. This 
made it vital that the various representatives not be unduly influenced by other considerations.   
Failure to keep disciplines separate in their functions was illustrated in one change board, during a discussion 
about a Lithium-ion battery short-circuit occurrence for which no definite cause could be found. This battery was 
being proposed for the shuttle EMU. When the safety organization presented their position that the program could 
proceed with corrective actions, one of their findings was that the program may not be able to afford developing a 
battery tolerant of sorts. However, this particular configuration never flew, but when safety worries about cost, it is 
unclear who worries about safety.
41 
Separation of functions during conduct of a program is also important to assure an adequate set of checks and 
balances. During the battery program discussed above, it was discovered that a series of test anomalies went 
uninvestigated. Engineering controlled Quality Assurance, thus effectively destroying Quality Assurance’s 
independence; therefore, that discrepancy paper was not written. The engineers wanted to complete the test 
program.
42 
In summary, these are just a few examples of past space flight program efforts that were affected by the various 
factors as identified. History has a way of repeating itself, especially when past lessons have not been sufficiently 
inculcated into the culture; therefore, it should not be surprising for some of these same, unintended circumstances 
to recur in future programs. 
VI.  Future of Spacesuit Knowledge Preservation 
 The U.S. spacesuit legacy is full of lessons learned that are being preserved, including information that only 
NASA has, but this information will be useful only if those individuals needing it are aware of its availability and 
location. 
To help spacesuit researchers find information that can lead them to success, the U.S. Spacesuit Knowledge 
Capture program is gathering useful knowledge from spacesuit experts through digitally recording their 
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presentations of collective memories and documentation. The recordings are stored in contemporary formats for 
easy access.  
Relying on a tool such as the U.S. Spacesuit KC repository makes it possible for future spacesuit designers, 
educators, students, and the general public to access knowledge that will reduce redundancy in learning and promote 
new ideas and knowledge built on lessons learned. It can also eliminate the knowledge gap that exists when 
employees leave and take their knowledge with them, when a program ends, and when new issues or unanticipated 
knowledge needs arise.  
To fill the knowledge gap and encourage authorized users to search for and use this information, it is important 
that the retrieval system be easily accessible to them. The search model should tie together relative information to 
cause researches to find a plethora of information on any particular topic, allowing the user to collect as much or as 
little information as desired. To enhance information searches, the format of search engines should be considered. 
Search engines should include various search categories and categorize data in a consistent, meaningful way by 
selecting from a preset list of preferred terms (e.g., presenter’s name, date of presentation, subject of presentation, 
key words, etc.), abstracts or synopses of documented information, and multiple ways of searching and finding 
pertinent information. Currently, certain information is archived without a quick and easy way to share it. It would 
be helpful for this information should be in the mainstream. Authorized users need to know the location of this 
information and have simple accessibility to it. Like that of a city library, the agency and its centers could establish a 
virtual library where a user could browse information in a particular discipline, similar to a physical library that has 
information sectioned within individual categories. Captivating graphics and links within documents that lead the 
researcher to additional relative information can also help spark the researcher’s interest and increase his or her use 
of the knowledge capture repository. 
Although some of the spacesuit knowledge captured includes proprietary information that is intended only for 
authorized NASA employees, that which is non-sensitive and relevant for outside users to have should be made 
available to them. Sharing this information not only benefits the person who is learning, it can also spur the much-
needed support for continued U.S. scientific efforts and lead to more scientific advancements. 
It appears the majority of Americans support the sciences, especially those between the ages of 18 to 49. 
According to a July 2009 GALLOP® article: “On the eve of the 40th anniversary of the U.S. moon landing, a 
majority of Americans say the space program has brought enough benefits to justify its costs. The percentage 
holding this view is now at 58% and has increased over time. Notably, those old enough to remember the historic 
moon landing are actually somewhat less likely than those who are younger to think the space program's costs are 
justified. Among Americans aged 50 and older (who were at least 10 years old when the moon landing occurred), 
54% think the space program's benefits justify its costs, compared with 63% of those aged 18-49.”43 To continue 
NASA’s increased popularity trend, it is advantageous to be part of young Americans’ educational awareness and 
growth. 
The knowledge capture collection is educational, and as a way of sharing this material, it could be put into an 
open-access format with the capability similar to a learning university (e.g., a massive open online course (MOOC)). 
An open-access format helps users increase their knowledge from a network of connections. NASA’s Science, 
Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM) initiatives and educational outreach, particularly through its science 
missions, have encouraged America’s young students to focus on advanced studies in science, technology, 
engineering, and math. Using this format to give the public access to non-sensitive information can help ignite and 
maintain that interest. This format will augment the already existing multitude of docuements that exist and are 
accessable to the public. 
Every piece of information that is deemed important should be shared with authorized users. Centers and outside 
entities can lean on each other and benefit from knowledge sharing. 
VII. Conclusion 
The U.S. Space Agency has achieved missions that no other country or entity has. The trove of valuable 
information that it has retained will be useful only if it is shared with researchers. Although NASA has had many 
past accomplishments, only the surface of scientific discoveries has been revealed. If this information is adequately 
disseminated, it will help the United States to reach extraordinary scientific goals and be a world leader in science. 
For next-generation scientists, engineers, educators, and histories, our nation’s future history depends on this 
information being shared.    
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